

THE BODYGUARD

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DEATH OF A PRINCESS

The Professional Bodyguard's Perspective by *MARK YATES*



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
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


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


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IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

By *Andy Wilson* **LEBAI.**

(Continued from last issue.)

Improvised Explosive Devices (I.E.Ds) are a threat to everyone and are used with great effect all over the world. In the period from November 1996 to January 1997 there have been I.E.D incidents in London, New York, Paris and Moscow and they have also been used with devastating results in India and Algeria.

CAR AND LORRY BOMBS

Car and lorry bombs enable the terrorist to camouflage a large device and move it a long distance if necessary. The car bomb can be used against an individual or an area target. Area targets are usually business areas. Over the past few years, this type of device has been used in London, New York, and Paris. All it takes is for someone to drive the lorry to the target and leave it to explode. The down side of this is that this device needs to be placed on a route or near an entrance/exit of a building used by the target. This device can be triggered by remote control, command wire, or if the target is a punctual person, by timer. A method of delivery to a high security area or a SF Base is to use a suicide bomber or force someone to drive the bomb to the target. The latter is common Terrorist method used in Northern Ireland. It starts with the intended driver being kidnapped or having his house taken over and informed that if he doesn't drive the device to the target, his family will be harmed. He is then chained and locked into the vehicle with the device and told how long he's got to drive the device to the target before the device explodes. He has little choice but to drive to the target as fast as possible and hope that the SF at the other end can get him out before the device goes off.

IMPROVISED MINES

These devices can vary in size and can be disguised as virtually anything. The imagination and ability of the bomber only limit their triggering method. In Northern Ireland large devices are usually placed in rural areas in culverts, under roads or are perhaps disguised in milk churns or bails of hay. In urban areas they may be placed in lampposts, rubbish bins or in vertical drainage piping on the side of a building being lowered in from the top of the pipe and detonated by command wire. The command wire can go over the building or laid in the guttering to a firing point out of the line of sight of the killing zone. In all such operations in Northern Ireland, youths are

used as watchers (*dickers*) the child at the end of the road shouting to his friends could be telling the bomber that you are in his killing zone.

SLEEPER BOMBS

An IED can be placed in position months before it explodes. If its known that at a pre-determined time in the future your client will be attending a function, or staying in a certain place, then precautions need to be taken. In 1984 in Brighton, England such a device killed five people in an IRA attempt to Assassinate the then British Prime Minister Lady Thatcher

DEFENCE AGAINST CAR BOMBS AND MINES

To beat the area car bomber one has to be vigilant and suspicious. If a vehicle looks suspicious then get it checked out. Police and government SF have an advantage over the EPO in being able to check out the background of a vehicle (i.e. is it stolen or rented very quickly). So, if you are suspicious of a vehicle call the authorities and let them check it out; If you are unwilling or unable to contact the authorities then avoid the vehicle. For the EPO when the car bomb or mine threat is directed at his/her client then detailed precautions need to be taken. If there are limited routes in and out of the client's home or work, then these routes need to be physically checked regularly. Any suspect cars, recent digging or wires leading away from the road need to be checked out. When the client is travelling to and from work or a place regularly frequented the routes must be varied as much as possible. All trips should be kept secret until the last minute and then is advance checked by the AST security team, who need to arrive at the destination with enough time to check out the area before the client arrives. When entering and exiting a building, different doors need to be used and if necessary fire escapes and staff entrances also. If the client is to stay in a hotel his/her room will need to be

Unattended vehicles need to be professionally searched by trained officers



searched as well as the adjoining rooms if possible and a check kept on anyone using the rooms. If the rooms are booked a while in advance, a check will need to be conducted on all building work and maintenance carried out in between the time of booking, and the stay as it may have been used as a cover to plant a sleeper device.

HOW TO DEAL WITH AN IED

POLICE OR SECURITY FORCES SHOULD BE INFORMED AS SOON AS AN IED IS FOUND, OR IF YOU HAVE GOOD REASON FOR SUSPECTING AN OBJECT OR VEHICLE OF CONTAINING AN IED.

There are four steps when dealing with an IED.

Step One: **CONFIRM:**

The first step with a suspect IED is to confirm to the best of your ability whether the object/vehicle is an IED (i.e. are you under threat, is the object out of place, are you in an area where terrorists are operational. Is there a funny smell around the object such as almonds, marzipan, petrol). This is where your threat assessment comes in. An unattended bag in an airport will arouse more suspicion than an unattended bag in a restaurant, but both could be just as dangerous or harmless. If all unattended bags in bars restaurant were reported as IED's there would be hundreds of incidents every day, but one might be an IED. If you have good reason to suspect an object or vehicle then check it. Police and SF will be willing to help if you give them good reason for your suspicions.

Step Two: **CORDON:**

Once a device has been confirmed the area needs to be cordoned off to everyone. It depends on the size and location of the device as to how far the cordon should be away from the device. In the world of the EPO cordon, preparations and duties would fall on the static/residential security team. If an IED is discovered at the client's home the RST would have to deal with the initial cordon and clearing of the area. Cordon equipment needs to be on hand. i.e. mine tape, torches, maps of the area and communications equipment. Plans need to be made for evacuation procedures and cordon points for different types of device. All cordon and control points need to be physically checked for IED's before being set up.

Step Three: **CLEARING THE AREA:**

People should be moved out of the blast area of device, this depends on the size and location of the device. In some cases it may be safer to leave people in buildings and under cover rather than move them in the open. When evacuating people, a route should be taken that is out of line of site of the device; if the device explodes when evacuating, flying glass is a danger that needs to be considered as is the threat from a secondary device.



A simple improvised explosive device with a small amount of explosives is enough to have a devastating effect on your VIP's vehicle.

Step Four: **CONTROLLING THE INCIDENT:**

Control of all IED incidents should be handed over to the authorities as soon as possible. You need to: brief your relief, tell him/her where the device is, when it arrived, how it arrived where your cordon positions are. Is there anyone still inside the cordon, if so where are they. You also need to pass on any relevant information of threats that have been made or suspicious incidents, or people that have been in the area. Not only is this professional, but it may also help catch the bomber.

The disposal and diffusion of IED's is to be left to trained professionals. Do not attempt it yourself.

CONCLUSION

The above is for basic information purposes only. When a threat assessment reveals a threat from IED's, a great deal of Professional planning is needed. Whether a loan operator or a team member, procedures need to be made for every eventuality. IED's is a vast in-depth subject that needs to be regularly studied. Everyone in the security industry needs to have a basic knowledge of how IED's work and the effects of their explosions. Search techniques and IED recognition are a must for all security personnel. IED's are the most widely used terrorist weapon.

This concludes Andy's very informative 2-part article.

Apologies.

In edition 7 we published the incorrect name of one of the contributing editors, i.e. 'The gratuitous attacker.' The material was taken from a lesson plan belonging to Geoff Thompson. Sorry for the mistake Geoff, and thanks for your understanding.