



EXECUTIVE O.P.S. ORGANIZATION OF PROTECTIVE SERVICES INTERNATIONAL

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**CHAINS BIND, IF YOU LET THEM.
BE AGGRESSIVE AND BREAK THEM.**

A NEWSPRINT ON THE WORLD OF PROTECTIVE SERVICES AND TRAINING

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For the professional as well as the private citizen
concerned about security and self-protection issues.

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
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IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Improvised Explosive Devices (I.E.D's) are a threat to everyone and are used with great effect all over the world. In the period from November 1996 to January 1997 there have been I.E.D incidents in London, New York, Paris and Moscow and they have also been used with devastating results in India and Algeria.

The basic IED can be made from commercially available stores. Information on how to construct them may be obtained from military survival bookstores to the Internet. Their sizes range from being as small as a music cassette case to as large as an oil tanker and may be disguised as virtually anything thus enabling the terrorist to kill selectively or indiscriminately without being in the immediate area and having to confront Security Forces (SF). This may explain why the IED is preferred weapon of many cranks and Terrorists world-wide and is the most dangerous threat to all SF and Executive Protection Officers (E.P.Os) today. I have listed below some basic information on IED and some guidelines for dealing with them,

TERRORIST TACTICS

The IED's below can be used on their own or in combinations. Good bombers will place a secondary device in order to kill personnel coming to the aid of the victims of the first blast. The first device may also be used to channel people in to a larger secondary device or to draw SF personnel into a booby trapped area. Below are some examples of tactics used by an Irish terrorist.

EXAMPLE ONE: A man is shot and killed at close quarters in a shoe shop where he worked. The assassins leave behind an IED in a shoe -box set to detonate twenty to thirty minutes after the shooting by which time SF and emergency services will be in the area.

EXAMPLE TWO: A car bomb is detonated in a small village. The SF and emergency services are limited to the routes they can take to get to the incident. A large IED along one of the routes into the village has a good chance of success against the SF and emergency services response.

EXAMPLE THREE: A suspect car is parked on waste ground and inside there appears to be a mortar tube. A manned cordon is placed around the vehicle and when the cordon teams search their positions, one team finds an IED on a tripwire. After further searches of the cordon area, another IED is found in a likely cordon position whilst the mortar tube in the car turns out to be a plastic drain pipe. The car was a hoax designed to draw SF into the IED'S on the cordon positions.

EXAMPLE FOUR: A car is parked on the side of a country-lane which is known to be occasionally patrolled by SF. When the SF patrol spots the car, they check with their control to see if it is stolen or suspect. It's not. They can see nothing suspect so two members of the

patrol move forward to check the car. They are carrying electronic counter measures equipment to combat and identify radio signals. The bomb was not in the car but in a ditch several meters from the car and detonated by command wires.

As you can see, you should take nothing at face value, be suspicious and before entering a suspect area, check it out very carefully.

TYPES OF DEVICES

The Letter/Parcel Bomb

The Letter-Parcel bomb is the most widely used of all IED's. The bomber's range from stalkers to large terrorist organisations. The letter bomb affords the bomber a direct line to the target and virtual anonymity for themselves as they can post the device from virtually anywhere the world. As the name suggests, the device is placed in an envelope or parcel and posted to the target. On its opening, the device explodes.

DEFENCE AGAINST LETTER PARCEL BOMBS

Below is a list of things that should be checked for on all mail if you or our client is under threat from letter bombs. If some of the following criteria is evident in a package or letter, it should be put through an x-ray machine to confirm or ally suspicions. Also, a bomb porch and a safe area should be available to place a suspect package. The package would have been knocked around whilst in the postal system so it would be advisable to take it to a safe area- don't just open it.

LETTER AND PARCEL BOMB RECOGNITION CHECK LIST

1. Are you expecting the letter or package?
2. Was it delivered by hand (to avoid the postal system)?
3. Is the envelope lopsided or uneven?
4. Is the envelope rigid?
5. Is there excessive securing material such as Cello-tape, string etc.?
6. Are there visual distractions on the envelope such as a company stamp, official stamp, etc.?
7. Are there any protruding wires or tin foil?
8. Was there excessive postage paid ?
9. Was the address poorly typed?
10. Is there any childish hand writing (it could be disguised)?
11. Any excessive weight?
12. No return address?
13. Any oily stains, discoloration or finger prints on the envelope or package?
14. Any incorrect titles?

15. Any titles but no names?
16. Is there any misspellings of common words?
17. Any restrictive markings such as Confidential or Personal?
18. Are there any suspicious postmarks such as Baghdad or Belfast?
19. Is the address stencilled?
20. Are there any holes or pinpricks which could be used to let out explosive fumes?
21. Is there an odour of bitter almonds or of Marzipan or of perfume to mask them?
22. Is there any mechanical sound?

INCENDIARY BOMBS

A simple form of this device can be made as small as a cigarette packet and made from everyday items such as condoms and commercially available chemicals. Incendiary bombs are usually used against shops and businesses. They can easily be placed between the cushions of furniture or among flammable objects and can be timed to go off when the building is empty causing maximum fire damage which helps to give the bomber anonymity.

Defence Against Incendiary Devices

If your client or his business has received a threat of incendiary attack the following precautions should be taken particularly if they own a shop. A deterrent would be to install a video surveillance camera and high profile security personnel carrying out 24-hr patrols. This would be enough to deter most bombers but if not the video footage from the cameras will help to catch the bomber. If the client's workplace is in an office block or suite, then access needs to be restricted as much as possible. Visitors should not be left unsupervised. Cameras should be installed at high-risk areas (i.e. entrances/exits, outside toilets). Also, all personnel entering the building must be subject to searches. All videos with recent footage should be stored in a fireproof box.

BLAST BOMBS

This device can be made to be very small. A device can easily be placed in a take-away food container or bag and placed in a bin or in a pile of rubbish. In England a few years ago, IEDs were hidden and detonated in bicycle frames. The bomb blast is mainly used to disrupt and to cause maximum confusion. In the city of London in the early '90s a spate of these devices left in rubbish bins resulted in all bins being removed from the streets and the London Underground. These devices cause a great deal of damage and kill indiscriminately.

Defence against Blast Bombs

Realistically, there is very little that can be done to stop a bomber planting these devices in a city centre. The device can be very easily disguised and moved during rush hour in a town. It would be impossible to watch everyone let alone search everyone. Security cameras on buildings and in shops would be useful when trying to identify the bomber after the device

has detonated. If your client is to appear or attend a function or venue then precautions should be taken. A search of the empty venue should be done by experienced personnel with a sniffer dog if possible. After the search, strict access control needs to be put in place. With all entrance/exits covered. Searches and checks need to be made on all people entering the venue especially with contractors and casual staff who are employed just for that event.

UNDER VEHICLE BOOBY TRAP (UVB)

This device is a favourite weapon of Northern Irish terrorist groups. The device is placed in a container such as an empty video case or a Tupperware container and attached to the vehicle using magnets. The usual method of triggering the device is by using a tilt or vibration sensitive switch. The UVB enables the bomber to attack selective targets. They are more risky to place as access to the target's vehicle is needed. If the terrorist manages to plant the device once in place, the UVB will kill and maim the occupants of the vehicle indiscriminately.

Defence against UVB

The best defence against the UVB is to deny the bomber access to the vehicle. If the vehicle is in a securicor garage, the entrance and driveway need to be physically checked before the vehicle is moved. There could be a device attached to the garage door or a land mine in the driveway. If there is no secure parking and someone cannot stay with the vehicle, then the vehicle must be physically searched for IED's and suspicious cars. Searching the vehicle for IEDs is a very important skill and needs to be studied and practised regularly. As it is a subject in its own right, I haven't the room to go into its details here.

CAR AND LORRY BOMBS

Car and lorry bombs enable the terrorist to camouflage a large device and move it a long distance if necessary. The car bomb can be used against an individual or an area target. Area targets are usually business areas. Over the past few years, this type of device has been used in London, New York, and Paris. All it takes is for someone to drive the lorry to the target and leave it to explode. Against the individual this device needs to be placed on a route or near an entrance/exit of a building used by the target. This device can be triggered by remote control, command wire, or if the target is a punctual person, by timer. A method of delivery to a high security area or a SF Base is to use a suicide bomber or force someone to drive the bomb to the target. The latter is common Terrorist method used in Northern Ireland.

It starts with the the intended driver being kidnapped or having his house taken over and informed that if he doesn't drive the device to the target his family will be harmed. He is then chained and locked into the vehicle with the device and told how long he's got to drive the device to the target before the device explodes. He has little choice but to drive to the target as fast as possible and hope that the SF at the other end can get him out before the device goes off.

15. Any titles but no names?
16. Is there any misspellings of common words?
17. Any restrictive markings such as Confidential or Personal?
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IMPROVISED MINES

These devices can vary in size and can be disguised as virtually anything. Their triggering method is only limited by the imagination and ability of the bomber. In Northern Ireland large devices are usually placed in rural areas in culverts, under roads or are perhaps disguised in milk churns or bails of hay. In urban areas they may be placed in lamp posts, rubbish bins or in vertical drainage piping on the side of a building being lowered in from the top of the pipe and detonated by command wire. The command wire can go over the building or laid in the guttering to a firing point out of the line of sight of the killing zone. In all such operations in Northern Ireland youths are used as watchers (dickers) the child at the end of the road shouting to his friends could be telling the bomber your in his killing zone.

SLEEPER BOMBS

An IED can be placed in position months before it explodes. If its known that at a certain time in the future your client will be attending a function, or staying in a certain place precautions need to be taken. In 1984 in Brighton, England such a device killed five people in an IRA attempt to kill the then British Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher.

DEFENCE AGAINST CAR BOMBS AND MINES

To beat the area car bomber one has to be vigilant and suspicious. If a vehicle looks suspicious then get it checked out. Police and government SF have an advantage over the EPO in being able to check out the background of a vehicle (i.e. is it stolen or rented very quickly). So, if you are suspicious of a vehicle call the authorities and let them check it out; if you are unwilling or unable to contact the authorities then avoid the vehicle. For the EPO when the car bomb or mine threat is directed at his/her client then detailed precautions need to be taken. If there are limited routes in and out of the clients home or work, then these routes need to be physically checked regularly. Any suspect cars, recent digging or wires leading away from the road need to be checked out. When the client is travelling to and from work or a place regularly frequented the routes must be varied as much as possible. All trips should be kept secret until the last minute and then be proceeded by an advance security team which needs to arrive at the destination with enough time to check out the area before the client arrives. When entering and exiting a building, different doors need to be used and if necessary, fire escapes and staff entrances. If the client is to stay in a hotel his/her room will need to be searched with the adjoining rooms if possible and a check kept on anyone using the rooms. If the rooms are booked a while in advance a check will need to be done on all building work and maintenance carried out in between the time of booking and the stay as it may have been used as a cover to plant a sleeper device.

HOW TO DEAL WITH AN IED

POLICE OR SECURITY FORCES SHOULD BE INFORMED AS SOON AS A IED IS FOUND OR IF YOU HAVE GOOD REASON FOR SUSPECTING AN OBJECT OR VEHICLE OF BEING AN IED.

There are four steps when dealing with an IED.

Step one: CONFIRM:

The first step with a suspect IED is to confirm to the best of your ability whether the object/vehicle is an IED (i.e. are you under threat, is the object out of place, are you in an area where terrorists are operational, is there a funny smell around the object such as almonds, marzipan, petrol). This is where your threat assessment comes in. An unattended bag in an airport will arouse more suspicion than an unattended bag in a restaurant but both could be just as dangerous or harmless. If all unattended bags in bars restaurant were reported as IEDs there would be hundreds of incidents every day, but one might be an IED. If you have good reason to suspect an object or vehicle then check it. Police and SF will be willing to help if you give them good reason for your suspicions.

Step two: CORDON:

Once a device has been confirmed the area needs to be cordoned off to everyone. It depends on the size and location of the device and how far the cordon should be away from the device. In the world of the EPO cordon preparations and duties would fall on the static/residential security team. If an IED turns up at the clients home the RST would have to deal with the initial cordon and clearing of the area. Cordon equipment needs to be on hand i.e. mine tape, torches, maps of the area and communications equipment. Plans need to be made for evacuation procedures and cordon points for different types of device. All cordon and control points need to be physically checked for IEDs before being set up.

Step three: CLEARING THE AREA:

People should be moved out of the blast area of device, this depends on the size and location of the device. In some cases it may be safer to leave people in buildings and under cover rather than move them in the open. When evacuating people, a route should be taken that is out of line of site of the device; if the device explodes when evacuating, flying glass is a danger that needs to be considered as is the threat from a secondary device.

Step four: CONTROLLING THE INCIDENT:

Control of all IED incidents should be handed over to the authorities as soon as possible. You need to: brief your relief, tell him/her where the device is, when it arrived, how it arrived where your cordon position are, is there anyone still inside the cordon and where they are. You also need to pass on any relevant information of threats that have been made or suspicious incidents or people that have been in the area. Not only is this professional, but it may also help catch the bomber.

THE DISPOSAL AND DIFFUSION OF IEDS IS TO BE LEFT TO TRAINED PROFESSIONALS DO NOT TRY IT YOUR SELVES .

CONCLUSION

The above is only basic information. When a threat assessment reveals a threat from IEDs , a great deal of planning is needed. Whether a loan operator or a team member , procedures need to be made for every eventuality . IEDs is a vast subject that needs to be studied. Everyone in the security industry needs to have a basic knowledge of how IEDs work and the effects of their explosions. Search techniques and IED recognition are a must for all security personel. IEDs are the most widely used terrorist weapon and threat today and will be for a long time to come.

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